FIN6 Hackers Group Targeting Enterprise Network to Deploy LockerGoga and Ryuk Ransomware

FIN6 cybercrime group tied with a LockerGoga and Ryuk ransomware that targets the enterprise network in an engineering industry by compromising the internet facing system.

Researchers from FireEye recently learning this incident from their customer’s network and the further investigation reveals that the FIN6 group was in the Initial stage of attack.

FIN6 using publicly available tools such as Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Adfind and 7-Zip to conduct internal reconnaissance, compress data and other operation to gain the network access.

Lockergoga infection was first spotted in January 2019, the ransomware particularly targets on critical infrastructure, and the Ryuk Ransomware campaign targeting various enterprise network around the globe and encrypting various data in storage, personal computers, and data center.

Researchers Stated that “Our team quickly linked this activity with some recent Mandiant investigations and enabled us to determine that FIN6 has expanded their criminal enterprise to deploy ransomware in an attempt to further monetize their access to compromised entities.”

FIN6 Infection Life Cycle

Initially, FIN6 compromise the internet facing system to gain access to the enterprise environment using stolen credentials and move to the further internal network by abusing the Windows Remote Desktop Protocol.

In this case, Attackers are using 2 different technique to intrude the targeted network.

First technique, FIN6 using PowerShell to execute an encoded command that consists of base64 encoded payload which is actually a Cobalt Strike httpsstager that was injected into the PowerShell process.

Cobalt Strike was actually configured to download the second payload from hxxps://176.126.85[.]207:443/7sJh.

Second Technique, Attackers abusing the Windows services which are random name service that is using Metasploit.

The Metasploit reverse HTTP payload was configured to communicate with the command and control (C2) IP address to download the additional payload.

According to FireEye Report, To achieve privilege escalation within the environment, FIN6 utilized a named pipe impersonation technique included within the Metasploit framework that allows for SYSTEM-level privilege escalation.

Through separate Mandiant Incident Response investigations, FireEye has observed FIN6 conducting intrusions to deploy either Ryuk or LockerGoga ransomware.

Indicator of Compromise

Type	Indicator
Network	31.220.45[.]151 46.166.173[.]109 62.210.136[.]65 89.105.194[.]236 93.115.26[.]171 103.73.65[.]116 176.126.85[.]207 185.202.174[.]31 185.202.174[.]41 185.202.174[.]44 185.202.174[.]80 185.202.174[.]84 185.202.174[.]91 185.222.211[.]98hxxps://176.126.85[.]207:443/7sJh hxxps://176.126.85[.]207/ca hxxps://176.126.85[.]207:443/ilX9zObq6LleAF8BBdsdHwRjapd8_1Tl4Y-9Rc6hMbPXHPgVTWTtb0xfb7BpIyC1Lia31F5gCN_btvkad7aR2JF5ySRLZmTtY hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/0v6RiYEY hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/YAm4QnE7 hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/p5U9siCD hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/BKVLHWa0 hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/HPpvY00Q hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/L4LQQfXE hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/YAm4QnE7 hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/p5U9siCD hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/tDAbbY52 hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/u9yYjTr7 hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/wrehJuGp hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/tDAbbY52 hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/wrehJuGp hxxps://pastebin[.]com/raw/Bber9jae
Host	031dd207c8276bcc5b41825f0a3e31b0 0f9931210bde86753d0f4a9abc5611fd 12597de0e709e44442418e89721b9140 32ea267296c8694c0b5f5baeacf34b0e 395d52f738eb75852fe501df13231c8d 39b7c130f1a02665fd72d65f4f9cb634 3c5575ce80e0847360cd2306c64b51a0 46d781620afc536afa25381504059612 4ec86a35f6982e6545b771376a6f65bb 73e7ddd6b49cdaa982ea8cb578f3af15 8452d52034d3b2cb612dbc59ed609163 8c099a15a19b6e5b29a3794abf8a5878 9d3fdb1e370c0ee6315b4625ecf2ac55 d2f9335a305440d91702c803b6d046b6 34187a34d0a3c5d63016c26346371b54